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Abstract
This paper situates the public debate over the use of living animal organs and tissue for human therapies within
the history of experimental islet transplantation. Specifically, the paper compares and contrasts the Canadian and
Australian responses on xenotransplantation to consider what lessons can be learnt about the regulation of a
complex and controversial biotechnology. Sobbrio and Jorqui described public engagement on xenotransplantation in
these countries as ‘important forms of experimental democracy.’ While Canada experimented with a novel nation-wide
public consultation, Australia sought public input within the context of a national inquiry. In both instances, the outcome
was a temporary moratorium on all forms of clinical xenotransplantation comparable to the policies adopted in some
European countries. In addition, the Australian xenotransplantation ban coincided with a temporary global ban on
experimental islet allotransplantation in 2007. Through historical and comparative research, this paper investigates
how public controversies over organ and tissue transplantation can inform our understanding of the mediation
of interspeciality and the regulation of a highly contested technoscience. It offers an alternative perspective on
the xenotransplantation controversy by exploring the ways in which coinciding moratoriums on islet allograft
and xenograft challenge, complicate and confound our assumptions regarding the relationships between
human and animal, between routine surgery and clinical experimentation, between biomedical science and social
science, and between disease risks and material contagion.
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Introduction
Xenotransplantation is ‘the practice of transplanting,
implanting or infusing cells, tissues or organs from one
species to another’ (Ravelingien et al. 2002, 92). It may
involve internal or external xenogenic therapies1 designed
as a temporary bridging device or as a ‘final solution to
end-stage organ failure’ (Boneva and Folks 2004, 504). For
the purpose of addressing organ scarcity, scientists have
generally experimented with organs and tissues from dif-
ferent breeds of pigs. However, towards the end of the
1990s, virologists began to query the safety of xenotrans-
plantation due to the possibility of infectious diseases
caused by porcine endogenous retroviruses. A number of
scientists called for a moratorium until the controversy
could be resolved through open debate and public policy.
While some countries adopted a ban, others pursued a
permissive stance on clinical xenotransplantation. A de
facto moratorium was adopted in Canada following a
novel experiment in public consultation. In Australia,
the xenotransplantation controversy was sparked by a
clinical trial involving the use of porcine cells to treat
diabetes. Following a national inquiry, the Australian
National Health and Medical Research Council
(NHMRC) imposed a 5 year moratorium on clinical tri-
als involving animal-to-human transplantation.
Sobbrio and Jorqui observed that public engagement on
xenotransplantation in Canada and Australia represented
significant developments in ‘experimental democracy’
(Sobbrio and Jorqui 2014, 523). They wrote,
Both the Canadian and Australian experiences shared
certain important features: they were launched by the
government as the expression of a more trusted andCorrespondence: myra.cheng@yahoo.com.au
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democratic social contract between institutions and
citizens; they aimed at engaging citizens in more direct
decision-making; they explored and inquired into
relevant issues about technological innovation and
social change; and they attempted to introduce a new
concept of scientific citizenship through the identity of
the citizen scientist (Sobbrio and Jorqui 2014: 528).
A number of publications have analysed the Canadian
and/or Australian xenotransplantation controversies. Such
work generally adopt either a national or comparative per-
spective (Sobbrio and Jorqui 2014; McLean and Williamson
2005; Cook 2011, 2014; Beynon-Jones and Brown 2011;
Einsiedel et al. 2011a; Tallachini 2011; Allspaw 2004;
Mortensen 2005). Comparing national approaches and
policies on clinical xenotransplantation is an important
method of social inquiry since it allows for an analysis
of convergences and divergences in public policy and scien-
tific culture in different countries (Jasanoff 2005). Scholars
working on xenotransplantation come from diverse dis-
ciplines including medicine, law, bioethics, sociology,
anthropology, literature, philosophy, political science,
communication studies, human animal studies and sci-
ence and technology studies. Aside from the relevant
biomedical literature, scholars from the humanities and
social science have analysed expert discourse, policy in-
struments, government reports, public debate, commu-
nity engagement and the processes of facilitating,
collecting, surveying and representing public opinion
on xenotransplantation.
Though infectious diseases have been a focus of re-
search in the biomedical science, it has generally been a
neglected topic in social science inquiry on xenotrans-
plantation. As such, this paper asks, what new knowledge
concerning biological contagion was uncovered during the
implementation of the xenotransplantation moratorium in
Canada and Australia? What are the social and policy
ramifications of this knowledge? A temporary prohibition
on clinical xenotransplantation was not the only policy
ban in the context of human experimentation. In 2007,
the Australian ban coincided with a temporary global
moratorium on the transplantation of human islets (insu-
lin-producing cells) issued by the Juvenile Diabetes
Research Foundation International (JDRF International).
The JDRF moratorium took effect in a number of
countries including Canada and Australia. This paper
examines the co-existing moratoriums on islet allograft
and xenograft to consider its wider ramifications for
public policy and research governance. In addition to a
comparative analysis on the Canadian and Australia re-
sponses, this paper also explores islet transplantation within
the historical context of diabetes research. Biomedical re-
search on the practice of islet grafting has a long history ex-
tending back to the late nineteenth century. Though
Canada and Australia are Commonwealth countries, the
cultures of science and regulation in these jurisdictions ex-
hibit differences both across borders and across timescapes
(Adam 1998).2 Situating the controversy over xeno-
transplantation in its historical context, can inform our
understanding of continuity, contingency, disruption
and anticipation in the trajectory of scientific research
on islet allograft and xenograft.
Following comments made by Daar, commentators in
the xenotransplantation debate often reiterate that ‘viruses
do not carry passports’ (Daar 1997, 975). Based my read-
ing of documents from diverse sources, I will illustrate
that viruses not only evade national borders, they also do
not adhere to our conceptual boundaries and disciplinary
categories. The Canadian and Australian moratoriums on
experimental islet transplantation clearly demonstrate that
the discourse of contagion is equally applicable to both al-
lotransplantation and xenotransplantation. Through a his-
torical and comparative narrative, I offer an alternative
perspective on the xenotransplantation controversy and
its significance for research regulation and public under-
standing of contagion in transplantation medicine. My
paper consists of five components. In Part I, I provide an
overview of the history of pancreatic islet allo- and xeno-
transplantation to treat diabetes. Part II recounts the be-
ginning of the xenotransplantation controversy as it un-
folded in Europe and the US including the introduction of
global regulations for clinical xenotransplantation. Parts
III and IV review national responses on xenotransplant-
ation in Canada and Australia, respectively. Finally, in Part
V, I discuss the problem of contagion in organ and tissue
transplantation with a focus on the moratorium issued by
JDRF International. The overlap between the Australian
ban on xenotransplantation and the global moratorium on
islet allotransplantation offer a key site to investigate the
limits of regulatory responses to clinical experimenta-
tion and public health risks. Moreover, controversies
over organ and tissue transplantation implicating spe-
cies categories complicate and confound our assump-
tions regarding the relationships between human
and animal, between routine surgery and clinical ex-
perimentation, between biomedical science and social
science, and between disease risks and material
contagion.
A brief history of Pancreatic Islet Xenograft and Allograft
to treat diabetes
Diabetes, or diabetes mellitus, is a metabolic disorder
characterised by an excessive level of glucose in the blood.
According to the eminent diabetologist, Robert Tattersall,
‘diabetes is not a single disease but a syndrome with at
least fifty possible causes’ (Tattersall 2009, 15). The body
either does not manufactured enough insulin or the cells
do not respond effectively to the insulin produced. Insulin
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is an essential hormone secreted by the pancreas. It enables
the body’s cells to absorb glucose and convert it into energy
required for muscle and tissue function. Since a person
with diabetes is not able to properly metabolise the glucose
in their blood, he or she may experience raised blood sugar
or hyperglycaemia. Over time, an excessive level of blood
sugar may lead to tissue damage and a range of life-
threatening health complications including blindness, kid-
ney failure, cardiovascular disease and limb amputations. In
her article for The New York Times, physician, Abigail
Zuger, described the importance of insulin as follows:
Without insulin the body is unable to use glucose,
its primary fuel … sugar and starch in the diabetic’s
diet turn into poison, clogging the bloodstream with
unusable glucose: the glucose is eliminated in
sweet-tasting urine as the body’s cells literally starve
in the midst of plenty. Insulin-deficient patients are
both thirsty and ravenous, but the more they eat, the
faster they waste away (Zuger 2010).
The term ‘diabetes’ derives from the Greek word
‘diabainem’ meaning ‘to pass through’ or ‘to siphon’
(Molinaro 2011, 8). The ancient Greeks understood
diabetes as a condition in which food and liquid intake
passes through the body instead of fuelling it. In the
nineteenth century, to categorise different types of dia-
betes, French physician Etienne Lancereaux distin-
guished between diabete maigre (thin diabetes) and
diabete gras (fat diabetes) (Tattersall 2009). Today,
these categories are revised as Type 1 diabetes and
Type 2 diabetes. While the former is common among
young people, the latter is generally diagnosed in the
adult population. The former is an autoimmune disease
associated with the destruction of insulin-producing islet
cells. The latter is a common form of diabetes arising from
the development of resistance to insulin. The risk of
insulin-resistant diabetes increases with age.
In the late nineteenth century, a significant turning point
in the scientific understanding took place when Oskar
Minkowski and Joseph von Mering demonstrated that dia-
betes was induced by the removal of the pancreas.
Minkowski also demonstrated that the auto-transplantation
of pancreas fragments in depancreatised dogs could tem-
porarily prevent diabetes (Benedum 1999). Following the
work of Minkowski and von Mering, physicians began to
conduct experimental transplants using pancreatic tissue in
an attempt to ameliorate diabetes. In December 1893,
Patrick Watson Williams performed a xenograft to treat a
15 year old patient critically ill with diabetes at the Bristol
Royal Infirmary (Williams 1894). With the assistance of his
surgical colleague, William Henry Harsant, Williams im-
planted three fragments of ovine pancreas into the subcuta-
neous tissue of the patient’s breast and abdomen. Each
fragment was comparable in size to a Brazil nut. The tissue
was procured from a sheep ‘freshly slaughtered.’ In addition
to the ovine graft, Williams also prescribed extracts from
minced sheep pancreas as oral therapy. Though the pa-
tient’s blood glucose fell after the operation, his condition
deteriorated. He died in a diabetic coma 3 days later.
A decade later, James Allan, a physician at the Glasgow
Infirmary, instructed his surgeon to repeat Williams’ ex-
periment using the pancreas of a cat in 1903. ‘I wished a
sheep’s pancreas, but this was deemed impracticable,’ Allan
reported. ‘Dr Barlow performed the operation skilfully …
But the final result has been a failure’ (Allan 1903a, 1903b,
711). The diabetic patient died 2 weeks after the transplant.
As an alternative to xenografts, surgeons also experimen-
ted with human pancreatic transplantation. In Australia,
the earliest record of such surgery took place at the
Launceston General Hospital in Tasmania. The operation
was performed by the Surgeon Superintendent, Dr (later
Sir) John Ramsay, in 1911. In an unpublished paper,
Ramsay documented that he had the opportunity to per-
form an experimental procedure when a young male pa-
tient suddenly died of a heart condition.3 He excised a
small portion of the tail of the cadaveric pancreas. Ramsay
then grafted the partial pancreas into the abdomen of a
59 year old female diabetic. Within a week, the operation
led to a gradual reduction in the level of glycosuria (the
presence of sugar in the patient’s urine). Indeed, Ramsay
even reported that the lowest level of glycosuria fell to
‘practically zero’ (Morris 1988, 635). In subsequent days,
however, it rose again to pre-operative levels indicating
graft failure. The implanted tissue was eventually removed
when the site of the surgery became inflamed. The patient
lived for another 7 years after the transplant surgery.
Following Ramsay’s experiment, Frederick Charles Pybus,
a surgeon from Newcastle-upon-Tyne, also attempted allo-
transplantation at the Royal Victoria Infirmary in 1916
(Pybus 1924). Pybus grafted fragments of cadaveric pancre-
atic tissues into the abdomen of two diabetics. Though
there was a mild reduction in glucose excretion in one of
the patients, neither transplant was successful. One patient
died 3 months after the operation. The second died 3 years
later. Pybus concluded,
… not much can be said about the principles of
grafting, but it seems that until we are able to
understand them … then we must continue to fail in
such operations, although they may appear the most
rational treatment for the disease for which they were
attempted (Pybus 1924, 551).
As is well known, Frederick Banting and colleagues iso-
lated insulin in the laboratories of Toronto University dur-
ing the inter-war period in 1921. Though other researchers
also conducted experiments to produce insulin, it was the
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Canadian researchers who embarked on clinical trials and
commercialised their research for widespread market distri-
bution. Not long after the successful isolation of insulin,
Banting also attempted a pancreatic autograft in a dog
though without success (Bliss 1992). After the Second
World War, the field of organ transplantation emerged
following successful kidney transplants between twins. In
February 1963, Claude Hitchcock performed a renal allo-
graft and xenograft on a 65 year old female diabetic with
end-stage renal failure (Hitchcock et al. 1964). Hitchcock
was the chief surgeon at Hennepin County Hospital in
Minneapolis. Since renal allograft was rejected after 3 days,
Hitchcock removed and replaced it with a kidney from a
baboon. The baboon kidney functioned for 4 days before
the patient died. Hitchcock described his experiment as the
‘first baboon renal heterograft’ (Hitchcock et al. 1964, 937).4
Three years later, in December 1966, William Kelly and
Richard Lillehei performed the first successful pancreas
transplant. A 28-year old patient with Type 1 diabetes re-
ceived a pancreas segment along with a renal graft and
duodedum. Following the transplant, the patient was
insulin independent for 6 days. She received irradiation
therapy to treat the development of graft pancreatitis. Due
to organ rejection, both the kidney and pancreas were
later removed. The patient died of surgical sepsis 2 months
after the operation (Sutherland and Groth 2010). Today,
diabetic patients may be offered either or both kidney
and pancreas transplants depending on a number of
considerations including the patient’s renal function and
the availability of organs. These procedures are termed
simultaneous pancreas and kidney transplant (SPK),
pancreas after kidney transplants (PAK), pancreas trans-
plant alone (PTA) and kidney transplant alone (KTA).
By contrast to pancreas and kidney transplantation, a
simple and less invasive alternative is islet transplantation.
The objective of such procedures is to infuse a sufficient
quantity of islet cells to control the level of blood glucose
and, thereby, overcome the need for exogenous insulin.
Insulin-producing beta cells comprise only 1–2 % of the
pancreas. Once the required tissue is isolated, a laparo-
scopic procedure is performed under local anaesthetic to
implant the islet cells. Gruessner and Gruessner sug-
gested that a pancreas transplant could be supple-
mented with an islet transplant to facilitate continued
insulin-independence (Gruessner and Gruessner 2013).
Through successful islet transplants, patients with renal
function can avert the need for a kidney transplant. Islet
transplantation is generally prescribed for Type 1 diabetes
patients with unstable diabetes and severe hypoglycaemia
unawareness. It is not advisable for all diabetic patients
due to the scarcity of available islets and the adverse side-
effects of immunosuppression drugs.
Similarly to the process of extracting insulin, the sep-
aration of islets from pancreatic tissue is a difficult and
complex procedure. Credit is attributed to Paul Lacy
and his colleagues who invented a collagenase digestion
technique necessary to isolate pancreatic islets (Lacy and
Kostianovsky 1967). In 1970s, scientists demonstrated
that islet transplantation could reverse diabetes in
rodents, dogs and monkeys (Ballinger and Lacy 1972;
Matas et al. 1976; Scharp et al. 1975). The first human
islet allograft was performed in 1974 using cadaveric
islet cells (Najarian et al. 1977). However, the procedure
was unsuccessful possibly due to the effects of immuno-
suppression drugs. It was not until more than a decade
later that Sharp and Lacy performed the first successful
islet cell transplant (Scharp et al. 1990). After the oper-
ation, the patient was insulin-independent for almost
1 month. Though a modest achievement, this result was
nevertheless a positive milestone for the field. Trans-
plant surgeon, James Shapiro, has speculated on the po-
tential efficacy of islet transplantation if immunological
barriers can be resolved. In an article commemorating
the discovery of insulin, he commented,
… an islet transplant could function for the entire
lifetime of the patient, as long as immunological
damage from recurrence of autoimmunity or allograft
rejection is prevented. The patient who has
maintained islet function for the longest period to
date received a transplant of her own islets after total
pancreatectomy at the University of Minnesota over
16 years ago and she remains insulin independent
(Shapiro 2002, 1399).
Islet autotransplantation is generally performed for pa-
tients with chronic pancreatitis following an operation
to remove the pancreas. Since the patient does not re-
quire the use of immunosuppressive drugs, there is a
greater likelihood of islet survival and, thus, islet func-
tion is retained for a longer period than in the context
of an islet allograft.
In parallel with developments in islet allotransplantation,
scientists have also begun to experiment with porcine islets.
Just over a century after Watson Williams attempted to
transplant ovine pancreatic tissue, researchers have revived
xenotransplantation as a possible therapy to cure diabetes
and other conditions. Porcine islets have been sourced from
fetal, neonatal and adult pigs. Source pigs may be wild-type
or genetically modified. Pigs are an ideal source of islet cells
because they are readily available, breed quickly, produce
large litters and display insulin secretion patterns compar-
able to those found in humans (Liu and Harlan 2008).
Porcine insulin was used to treat diabetics for many de-
cades. The hyper-acute rejection of pig tissue may be ame-
liorated through cloning and genetic modification. Though
pigs are generally the preferred source animal, researchers
have also experimented with islet cells from other species
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including cows, rabbit and fish (Mihalicz et al. 2011). By
comparison to non-human primates, pigs pose less disease
risks and less ethical concerns since they are lower on the
evolutionary scale (Boneva and Folks 2004).
The first islet xenotransplantation clinical trial was per-
formed by Carl-Gustav Groth, the former Chief Physician
of Transplant Surgery at Karolinska University Hospital,
in Huddinge, Sweden. Though Groth first conceived of
the idea in the mid-70s, it was not until the 1990s that he
performed his clinical trial. Between 1990 and 1993, Groth
treated ten participants with islet cells from porcine
foetuses (Groth et al. 1994). The pig cells were either
transplanted into the kidney capsule or infused into the
intra-portal vein. A subsequent kidney biopsy identified
viable islet cells and a related hormone called glucagon in-
dicating insulin secretion. Though the trial did not lead to
any reductions in the participant’s insulin requirements, it
did offer valuable preliminary data on graft function and
indication of long term survival of porcine cells in the hu-
man body. Two years later, another team of Swedish sci-
entist attempted to treat two dialysis patients with animal
external therapy. Patient blood was circulated through pig
kidneys for over an hour before it was returned to the pa-
tient’s body (Hanson 2011).
Groth’s work has inspired other scientists to pursue
islet xenograft through animal experimentation and
clinical trials. A number of studies have demonstrated
that porcine islet xenotransplantation could reverse
diabetes in non-human primates for at least 6 months
(Hering and Walawalkar 2009; Hering et al. 2006). Islet
xenotransplantation clinical trials have also been con-
ducted in several countries including Mexico, Russia,
China, New Zealand and Argentina. Some of these tri-
als indicate that islet xenotransplantation reduces the
required daily dosage of insulin and the incidence of
hypoglycaemia (Torrie 2012). However, in some coun-
tries, the development of islet xentransplantation was
halted for several years due to public health concerns
regarding the risks of infectious diseases. In the next
section, I will address the global public controversy
over xenotransplantation and proposals for a morator-
ium on high-risk research.
The Publics in/and Xenotransplantation: initial responses
to the risk of retroviral contagion
In the early 1990s, the field of xenotransplantation revita-
lised its research agenda with the announcement of the
first transgenic pig in Cambridge, England (Connor 1993).
Named Astrid, this pig was produced by British firm,
Imutran. Astrid was engineered with a gene—human
decay-accelerating factor (or hDAF)—to inhibit immuno-
logical rejection of porcine organs and tissues in humans
(Rosengard et al. 1995). Two years later, Imutran an-
nounced the results from its cardiac xenograft experiments
in monkeys. Two out of its ten cynomologus monkeys
survived for more than 60 days after their native heart were
replaced with a heart from a transgenic pig (Laurance 1995;
The Guardian 1995). This news was welcomed by biotech-
nology industry and positively reported in the media. One
journalist equated Imutran’s achievement to a significant
milestone in organ transplantation declaring,
It is the most exciting breakthrough since the first
heart transplant operation was performed by Christian
Barnard in 1967 (Palmer 1995, 7).
Perhaps unbeknown to the journalist, Barnard also
performed two cardiac xenotransplants in Cape Town,
South Africa. Due to a lack of available donor hearts,
Barnard resorted to hearts from non-human primates as
a bridging device.5 Initially, he implanted a baboon heart
into a 25 year old female patient. Barnard then repeated
the procedure transplanting a chimpanzee heart into a
60 year old male patient. The survival periods were poor
in both cases: 5.5 h and 4 days, respectively. Although
Barnard had planned to continue performing xenotrans-
plantation, he subsequently abandoned his idea conceding
that he ‘became too attached to the chimpanzee’ (Cooper
and Lanza 2000, 194).
As a consequence of the positive results attained by
Imutran, the company was acquired by the Swiss
pharmaceutical corporation, Sandoz, in 1996 (Reuters
News 1996). Sandoz had intended to develop xenotrans-
plantation as a clinical therapy. By the mid-nineties,
xenotransplantation attracted considerable venture cap-
ital. Towards the end of the decade, Persidis reported
that there were a total of 13 companies pursuing re-
search in xenotransplantation (Persidis 1999). Solomon
Brothers proposed what appears now to be an overly opti-
mistic financial assessment for such research. They
claimed that the market for xenotransplantation could be
worth approximately $6 billion by 2010 (Biotechnology
Business News 1994).
In anticipation of possible clinical trials, government
agencies and NGOs began to consider the ethics and
regulation of xenotransplantation. The Nuffield Council
on Bioethics, an independent British charity, conducted
the first public inquiry on the topic. In March 1996, it is-
sued an influential report titled, Animal-to-Human
Transplants: The Ethics of Xenotransplantation. The
Council’s report concluded that it is ‘ethically acceptable’
to use pig organs and tissues for transplantation given the
scarcity of human biological material (Nuffield Council on
Bioethics 1996, viii). Adopting a precautionary approach
on xenotransplantation, the report recommended the es-
tablishment of an advisory committee to oversee and
monitor xenotransplantation research and clinical trials.
According to Sobbrio and Jorqui, the Nuffield Council
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report was innovative since it was the first attempt to
apply the precautionary principle to protect public health
beyond the field of environmental science and humanities
(Sobbrio and Jorqui 2014). In the following year, an inter-
disciplinary committee appointed by the UK Department
of Health put forward a comparable report. Commonly
known as the ‘Kennedy Report’ after its chairperson, Sir
Ian Kennedy, this document reiterated some of proposals
made in the Nuffield Council report (U. K. Department of
Health 1997). Following both reports, the government
promptly set up the UK Xenotransplantation Interim
Regulatory Authority (UKXIRA). Inter alia, the terms of
reference for UKXIRA instructed the authority to provide
advice to government on ‘safety, efficacy and consider-
ations of animal welfare and any other pre-conditions for
xenotransplantation for human use, and whether these
have been met’ (UKIXRA 1998, 24).
In March 1997, a shift in the trajectory of xenotrans-
plantation research occurred when leading virologist,
Clive Patience and his colleagues alerted scientists and
the general public to the risks of infectious diseases as-
sociated with Porcine Endogenous Retroviruses (PERV).
Endogenous retroviruses are found in the genome of all
mammal species. Since porcine retroviruses are embed-
ded in the swine genome, it would be difficult to select-
ively breed pigs free of PERV and other pathogens. The
expression of PERV DNA has been found in a wide
range of pig organs and tissue including liver, lung,
kidney, heart, pancreas, skin, blood, endothelial cells
and bone marrow cells. Following in vitro laboratory
experiments, Patience et al demonstrated that human
cell lines could be infected by two strands of porcine
retroviruses (Patience et al. 1997). In vitro infection
does not necessarily lead to in vivo infection. Never-
theless, the possibility of PERV infection needs to be
taken seriously given past precedents for animal-to-
human viral transmission (eg rabies, Ebola, monkey
pox and herpes virus B). The term ‘xenozoonosis’ was
coined to refer to ‘an infectious agent introduced to
humans by xenogeneic tissue’ (O'Connell et al. 2000,
18). The results from in vivo PERV studies catalysed a
public debate within the scientific community and be-
yond on the ethics of conducting research posing pub-
lic health risks.
Following the paper by Patience et al, FDA researchers
confirmed the risks of cross-species infectivity due to
PERV in a similar experiment (Wilson et al. 1998). As a
consequence, the FDA suspended xenotransplantation
studies for a period of 5 months to introduce additional
regulatory measures. Before clinical trials could resume,
investigators were required to revised consent forms and
introduce surveillance procedures to screen source ani-
mals and monitor recipients for possible PERV infection
(Bloom 2001).
The public debate over retroviral risks of xenotrans-
plantation became further complicated by in vivo studies
on cross-species infection post-transplantation. PERV
transmission and infection has been documented in la-
boratory animals but not in human patients. For example,
diabetic immuno-compromised mice were infected by
PERV following transplantation of porcine islet cells (Van
Der Laan et al. 2000). In August 1998, Swedish scientists
published two papers in The Lancet. No PERV infection
was found the blood samples obtained from ten diabetics
who had undergone islet xenotransplantation (Heneine et
al. 1998). Similarly, there was also a negative result on
PERV transmission involving two dialysis patients exposed
to procine xenoperfusion (Patience et al. 1998). In the fol-
lowing year, the lack of PERV infection was also confirmed
in a large study of 160 patients published in Science (Para-
dis et al. 1999). This study consisted of patients from
a number of countries who had undergone different
types of therapies involving the use of animal tissue.
Some participants received porcine islet cells to treat
diabetes or temporary pig skin grafts to treat severe
burns. Most of the cohort previously participated in
a Russian xeno-perfusion experiment to assess an
‘immunotherapy’ (Paradis et al. 1999, 1237). Due to
their clinical results, the authors of the study advo-
cated the use of ‘closely monitored clinical trails’ to
evaluate the efficacy and safety of porcine xenogenic
therapies (Paradis et al. 1999, 1240). However, in an
editorial comment, virologist, Robin Weiss, urged
caution given the nature of epidemiological research.
He argued that ‘no evidence of risk’ is not the same
as ‘evidence of no risk’ (Weiss 1999, 1222).
Shortly after Patience et al published their research
results, Fritz Bach initiated a call for a national re-
view and moratorium on xenotransplantation clinical
trials. Bach is a prominent transplant immunologist
and the Lewis Thomas Distinguished Professor of
Immunology (Surgery) at Harvard Medical School.
Notwithstanding his strong commitment to xenograft
research, Bach argued against the premature introduc-
tion of such experimental procedures (Monaco 2011).
He advocated for public debate and input to deter-
mine whether or not it was justifiable to undertake
the research notwithstanding the inherent public health
risks. Bach called for a moratorium until ethical questions
could be resolved. In his view, ethical issues preceded
technical scientific considerations.
Bach attracted support for his advocacy from some
peers who assisted him to write papers. With eight co-
authors, Bach published a paper on their policy approach
on xenotransplantation research in Nature Medicine in
February 1998 (Bach et al. 1998a). Similarly, in a 2007
paper written with Ivinson, Bach posed an ethical chal-
lenge to their scientific colleagues asking,
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Why should we not apply the principle of informed
consent to entire communities when it is the
community as a whole that is being exposed to the
risk? At the very least, informed representatives of the
public should be given an opportunity to participate
actively and meaningfully in the decision about
whether and under what conditions society is exposed
to the risk. If it is unethical to foist a particular
medical risk on a patient, is it not equally unethical to
expose the public to a risk without first considering
their opinion? (Bach and Ivinson 2002, 129–130).
Bach et al argued that a moratorium was not ‘anti-sci-
ence’ (Bach et al. 1998b, 373). Rather, a temporary ban on
xenotransplantation would afford the public an opportun-
ity to participate in the debate. In other words, it is ‘a way
of respecting the rights of the public, thus preserving the
trust of the public in science’ (Bach et al. 1998b, 373). This
proposal is comparable to that required for individuals to
participate in biomedical research. It has been described a
form of ‘societal consent’ (Bach 1999, 66), ‘community
consent’ (Daar 1999, 58), or ‘social informed consent’
(Persson and Welin 2008, 53). If the informed consent of
the relevant community is not forthcoming, then xeno-
transplantation clinical trials should not proceed.
Across the Atlantic, the Council of Europe unani-
mously adopted a recommendation for a legally bind-
ing moratorium on xenotransplantation clinical trials
on the basis of the precautionary principle in 1999
(Council of Europe 2003).6 A call for public participa-
tion was already recommended by the Institute of
Medicine in its 1996 report on xenotransplantation
(Institute of Medicine 1996). However, the proposals
put forward by Bach and his colleagues were not ac-
cepted in the US. David Sachs and colleagues wrote a let-
ter in response (Sachs et al 1998). Sachs is the Paul S
Russell Professor of Surgery and Immunology at Harvard
Medical School and Director of the Transplantation Biology
Research Center at the Massachusetts General Hospital.
Sachs et al agreed with Bach et al on the need for caution.
However, the former group believed that local Institutional
Review Boards and the FDA could adequately carry out the
necessary evaluation and risk assessment for drug testing.
Sachs et al also emphasised that xenotransplantation is ‘cur-
rently seen as the most promising, near-term solution to a
severe shortage of human tissues and organs’ and that ‘to
convene new national bodies to consider the ramifications
… would undoubtedly lead to unnecessary delays and
avoidable loss of life’ (Sachs et al. 1998, 372). The FDA
aligned with the position advocated by Sachs and col-
leagues. At a conference convened by the National Insti-
tutes of Health (NIH) in January 1998, the Acting FDA
Commissioner, Michael Friedman, stated that the request
for a moratorium was a ‘highly valuable’ part of public
debate but added: ‘We believe that it’s important to set
up a framework to responsibly conduct research’ (Wad-
man 1998, 423). The FDA position is consistent with
the case-by-case approach adopted at the time by
UKIXRA (Einsiedel et al. 2011a).
The arguments for and against a moratorium on xeno-
transplantation clinical trials attracted commentary from
physicians in the US, Europe and Australia. Daniel Salomon
et al, speaking on behalf of the American Society of Trans-
plant Physicians and the American Society of Transplant
Surgeons, dismissed the proposals presented by Bach et al
as ‘at best, [the opinion of] a minority among US transplant
professionals’ (Salomon et al. 1998). They believed that
Bach et al had overestimated the infectious risks associated
with xenotransplant experiments. On the other hand, Peter
Collignon, an infectious disease expert from Australia, went
even further. In his view, a national approach was inad-
equate since viruses are not necessarily contained by
politico-juridical borders. As such, he argued for stringent
global regulation of xenotransplantation clinical trials with
‘uniform and enforceable control procedures’ (Collignon
1998, 519). He warned of the possibility of inadequate regu-
lation of research in some jurisdictions. Collignon wrote,
‘because of the demand for organs, countries with less
stringent regulations may become havens for the perform-
ance of less regulated, and therefore more dangerous, xeno-
transplantation procedures’ (Collignon 1998, 519). He
made a compelling argument for effective regulation by
underscoring the public health risks of xenotransplantation
as follows:
What we are collectively doing now and planning to
do in the future with xenograft transplants creates the
ideal conditions for animal viruses or infections to
cross the species barrier into humans and proliferate
… Xenotransplants thus represent one of the best
experiments we could devise to ‘create’ new infectious
agents. It would be somewhat paradoxical if the main
legacy of modern medicine’s involvement in
transplantation were another infection such as HIV
(Collignon 1998, 519).
Due to the global dimensions of the public health risks,
the World Health Organisation (WHO) became involved
in xenotransplantation research adopting a ‘pro-active
role’ (Noel 2007, 348). Since its first meeting in October
1997, WHO has worked with the International Xeno-
transplantation Association (IXA) to issue a series of guid-
ance documents on the prevention and management of
infectious diseases in the context of clinical xenotrans-
plantation (Daar 1999; Noel 2007). In collaboration with
the University Hospital of Geneva, the IXA and WHO has
also established a website to document xenotransplantation
clinical trials around the world. Thus far, their website -
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‘Inventory of Human Xenotransplantation Practice’ - has
collected data on 34 clinical trials.7 The inventory indicates
that xenografts experiments have been performed in
Europe, North America, Africa, Asia and the Pacific.
As events unfolded, some of the concerns raised by
Collignon became prescient. A controversy ensued over
a clinical trial conducted by Dr Rafael Valdes Gonzalez
at the Frederico Gomez Children’s Hospital of Mexico in
Mexico City. Valdes had collaborated with researchers in
Canada and New Zealand. Since 2001, he has treated at
least 22 minors with Type 1 diabetes - including two
Canadians – with neonatal porcine islets and Sertoli
cells (Armstrong 2004). These cells were placed in a col-
lagen coated device subcutaneously implanted in the
abdomen. Islet cells were combined with Sertoli cells
since it is believed that the latter induces immunological
tolerance. The study sought to build upon the work of
Groth et al undertaken in the previous decade. Valdes et
al claimed that their clinical trials produced promising
results. Two patients become insulin-independent for sev-
eral months. Half of the cohort experienced a ‘significant
reduction’ in insulin requirements (Valdés-González et al.
2005, 419). However, upon public announcement of the
study at a scientific conference in 2001, the trial attracted
strong public criticisms from IXA members (McKenzie
et al. 2002). A prolonged dispute took place between
Valdes and IXA scientists (Valdes 2002; Sykes et al. 2006;
Valdes-Gonzalez 2006). Due to pressures from the inter-
national scientific community, Mexican xenotransplant-
ation was eventually terminated by local government
authorities. By contrast to Valdes’ practice, a xenotrans-
plantation clinical trial outsourced by a New Zealand
company to a research institute in Moscow was not con-
tested by the scientific community. These trials voluntarily
adhered to the guidelines issued by the FDA which in-
cluded provisions for the surveillance and risk manage-
ment of infectious agents (Cook et al. 2011).
Following the controversy over xenotourism in
Mexico, the World Health Assembly (WHA) adopted a
Resolution on Human Organ and Tissue Transplant-
ation in May 2004. WHA Resolution 57.18 was passed
by 192 countries. It urges Member states ‘to allow xeno-
geneic transplantation only when effective national regu-
latory control and surveillance mechanisms overseen by
national health authorities are in place’ (Fifty-Seventh
WHA 2004: Clause II). Xenotransplantation clinical tri-
als should only be permissible in countries with a well-
developed regulatory framework to oversee high-risk
biomedical research. In the absence of stringent regula-
tions, clinical xenotransplantation would pose a global
public health risks. In addition, WHA Resolution 57.18
also advises Member States to engage in the harmonisa-
tion of regulatory practice and to ‘support international
collaboration and coordination for the prevention and
surveillance of infections resulting from xenogeneic
transplantation’ (Fifty-Seventh WHA 2004: Clause II).
Consistent with the global approach, permissive law
on xenotransplantation was enacted in Switzerland in
1999 (Griessler 2012). Xenotransplantation is permitted
subject to prior authorisation and due compliance with
regulatory requirements. Swiss interests in xenotrans-
plantation is linked to commercial investments in re-
search made by Norvatis (formerly Sandoz). On the
other hand, xenotransplantation research was also con-
tested by political parties and NGOs including the Green
Party, the Social Democratic Party, the Basel Appeal
Against Genetic Engineering, Greenpeace Switzerland,
Physicians against Animal Experimentation and the
Swiss Animal Protection. The local public debate on
xenotransplantation began in the mid-1990s. According
to Griessler, ‘the debate was neither extensive nor continu-
ous and only of concern to a small group of informed
actors from research, parliament, public administration
and stakeholder organizations’ (Griessler 2012: 64). A di-
verse range of views on xenotransplantation was can-
vassed in the federal parliamentary debates. Though a
proposed bill banning the procedure was introduced into
the Swiss parliament, it was defeated towards the end of
1999. In the following year, at the ‘PubliForum’—a consen-
sus conference on transplantation medicine—a majority of
lay participants affirmed their support for xenotransplant-
ation research (Griessler 2012: 66). Notwithstanding public
objections to xenotransplantation among sections of the
community, the introduction of permissive laws sought to
protect local research and economic interests in the Swiss
pharmaceutical industry. The conflict between global sci-
ence and local concerns regarding public health and patient
safety have taken place in other parts of the world. As fore-
shadowed, I will explore comparable developments in
Canada and Australia in the following two sub-sections of
this paper.
The Xenotransplantation controversy in Canada
Though Bach was not able to substantively influence the
policy discourse in the US, he did do so across the border.
In February 1998, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation
hosted a debate between Bach and Daniel Salomon on na-
tional radio.8 Bach also co-authored a paper for the
Canadian Medical Association Journal with neurologist,
Adrian Ivinson (Ivinson and Bach 2002). They explained
their argument for public participation by drawing an ana-
logy with the controversy over genetically modified food
and referring to Hendrik Verfaille, the President of Mon-
santo. In his pledge for a ‘new company,’ Varfaille stated:
We thought we were doing some great things. A lot
of other people thought we were making some
mistakes. We were blinded by our own enthusiasm.
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We missed the fact that this technology raises major
issues for people—issues of ethics, of choice, of trust,
even of democracy and globalization. As we tried to
understand what had happened, we realized that we
needed to hear directly from people about what they
thought, what their concerns were and what they
thought we ought to do. If we are to close the gap
between those who believe in the benefits and those who
have concerns, then something has to change (Ivinson
and Bach 2002, 43; Bach and Ivinson 2002, 131).
Given the above comments, Bach and Ivinson argued
that public consultation is both an ethical approach and
sound business practice. Their call for meaningful public
engagement was taken particularly seriously in Canada
where there is a long tradition of public consultation in
policy-making (Einsiedel et al. 2011a).
In the context of national science policy, Canadian
scholar, Einsiedel and her colleagues, positioned their
country between the US and Europe (Einsiedel et al.
2010). There is a lack of polarised views in Canada as
compared with other jurisdictions. Consistent with their
moderate approach on genetically modified food, Canad-
ian stakeholder groups for animals tend to advocate for
animal welfare rather than animal rights. In the US, the
regulatory style is defined by a ‘more adversarial culture’
whereby stakeholders tend to rely on the judicial systems
to pursue their claims and interests (Einsiedel et al. 2010,
110). This is demonstrated by the legal suits filed by Cam-
paign for Responsible Transplantation (CRT). CRT was
established by Alix Fano in New York. It is opposed to all
forms xenotransplantation. CRT has taken legal action
against the FDA and contested the appointment of com-
mittee members to the Secretary’s Advisory Committee
on Xenotransplantation (or SACX) (Bickford et al. 2005).
SACX was set up by the Department of Health and Hu-
man Services to review xenotransplantation policies in the
US. Fano maintained that the majority of committee
members were scientists with a vested interest in xeno-
transplantation. Hence, she described the activities of
SACX as a case of the ‘fox guarding the hen house’
(Allspaw 2004, 425).
Similarly, in the UK, the practice of xenotransplant-
ation was contested by the animal rights group, Un-
caged. In September 2000, Uncaged published a series of
articles drawing upon leaked documents on the operations
of Huntingdon Life Sciences in Cambridge (Einsiedel et al.
2011a). Huntingdon was contracted to perform xeno-
transplantation experiments on behalf of Imutran. The
leaked documents exposed breaches of laboratory stan-
dards, undue suffering of animals and inaccurate reporting
of scientific results. Imutran’s attempt to secure an in-
junction to restrain the publications made by Uncaged
was unsuccessful. Subsequently, Imutran terminated it
research activities in the UK and relocated its work to
an animal laboratory in the US (Einsiedel et al. 2011a).
By contrast to the US and UK, the Canadian approach
emphasized collaboration and representation. Community
consultation is a key process for achieving public consen-
sus. In addition, the xenotransplantation issue was also
shaped by a preceding controversy concerning the con-
tamination of the Canadian blood supply. As a conse-
quence, administrators took extra precautions to pursue a
‘more pro-active’ stance on risk management in trans-
plantation than in the past (Einsiedel et al. 2011a, 624).
Towards the end of 1997, Health Canada appointed an
expert advisory committee to convene a National Forum
on Xenotransplantation. As in other jurisdictions, the
committee comprised of experts from the biomedical and
social sciences including surgeons, veterinarians, virolo-
gists, lawyers and philosophers. The forum addressed the
clinical, regulatory and ethical aspects of xenotransplant-
ation. It recommended that ‘the public must be involved
in all stages of discussion on these issues and have their
perspectives incorporated into decision-making’ (Einsiedel
et al. 2011a, 624). As a consequence, a planning workshop
was held in April 2000 to design a process of public con-
sultation with stakeholders. Following the workshop,
Health Canada engaged the Canadian Public Health Asso-
ciation (CPHA) to organise an arms-length public consult-
ation. In turn, CPHA hired the Public Advisory Group
(PAG) to carry out the public consultation (Einsiedel et al.
2010). Prior to the work of PAG, the Proposed Canadian
Standard for Xenotransplantation was issued for public
comment in 1999. The proposed standards were written by
members of the expert advisory committee. It was intended
for the regulation of xenotransplantation clinical trials in
Canada.
PAG commenced the process of public engagement
in 2001 with an education and awareness program.
Given the Canadian draft standard on xenotransplant-
ation, their public consultation focused on one over-
arching question: ‘should Health Canada proceed with
xenotransplantation and, if so, under what conditions?’
(Einsiedel et al 2011b, 20). PAG sought public input
through two approaches: (i) an open model and (ii) a
representative model (Einsiedel et al 2011b, 26–27).
The first approach surveyed public opinion through
different modes of communications including website
questionnaire, stakeholder mail survey and informal
feedback through letters and email. The second is
based on a large telephone poll and a series of citizen
jury or citizen foras. A total of 1519 Canadian partici-
pated in the telephone survey which involved answer-
ing 60 questions (Einsiedel et al 2011b, 29). PAG held
six forums at regional sites across the country. Simi-
larly to the telephone poll, invitation to attend the citi-
zen forum was based on a random sampling process.
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The selection of participants was determined mainly
on demographics. Over two and half days, a total of
107 participants attended presentations given by ex-
perts on different aspects of xenotransplantation. The
expert panel comprised of experts in the field of trans-
plantation, infectious diseases, law, bioethics, animal
welfare and consumer health. Participants had an oppor-
tunity to pose questions to presenters and discuss matters
among themselves. Data from the citizen jury was ob-
tained through the proceedings and a participant survey.
PAG concluded that when participants were provided
with information, there was a greater likelihood that they
would oppose xenotransplantation.
Following the public consultation, PAG prepared a re-
port which put forward seven recommendations. The first
recommendation advised that Canada not proceed with
xenotransplantation clinical trials. The report concluded
that ‘the majority of informed Canadians do not support
xenotransplantation at this time’ (CPHA 2001, vi). PAG
explained that this outcome ‘did not mean that most in-
formed Canadians were absolutely opposed to xenotrans-
plantation. However, they favoured a precautionary
approach’ (CPHA 2001, 30). The report also identified a
number of critical issues yet to be resolved including
potential health risks, lack of pre-clinical knowledge,
unexplored alternatives therapies and the inadequacy
of existing regulations to govern xenotransplantation
clinical trials (CPHA 2001, vi).
The Canadian government has yet to issue an official
policy on xenotransplantation (Beynon-Jones and
Brown 2011, 646). At the same time, Health Canada has
revised and up-dated its standards on clinical xeno-
transplantation.9 Einsiedel et al suggested that the delay
in updating the standards could be interpreted as the
adoption of a ‘de facto moratorium’ (Einsiedel et al.
2010, 109). The Canadian Standards on xenotransplant-
ation is consistent with international guidelines includ-
ing the WHA Resolution 57.18. The Canadian national
inquiry was initiated because a scientist had indicated
his intentions to submit an application to conduct a
clinical trial involving the use of porcine cells. Thus far,
no such trials have taken place in Canada (Einsiedel
et al. 2011a). The Canadian public consultation on
xenotransplantation was a novel social experiments in
community engagement on a complex technoscience.
Einsiedel et al noted that it was the first ‘extensive de-
liberative consultation’ undertaken by Health Canada
(Einsiedel et al. 2010, 108). From their interviews with
members of the Canadian public service, Jones and
Einsiedel found that the xenotransplantation consult-
ation contributed to learning about public engagement
at Health Canada. While the routine of closed, expert-
driven regulatory practices was destabilised, Health
Canada has gone on to develop in-house infrastructure
and expertise for public engagement (Jones and Einsiedel
2011). In this regard, the xenotransplantation controversy
has enhanced openness and transparency in Canadian
health care administration.
Though the xenotransplantation consultation was wel-
comed as a positive development by social scientists, a
contrary response was presented by one biomedical
scientist. James R Wright expressed his discontent with the
PAG consultation in papers published in three prominent
biomedical journals: Transplantation, Xenotransplantation
and the Canadian Medical Association Journal (CMAJ)
(Wright 2002, 2003, 2004). Wright Jr described himself as
‘a xenotransplantation researcher’ and a member of the
Canadian Xenotransplantation Expert Working Group
(Wright 2002, 40). He identified what he considered to be
three serious problems with the Canadian public consult-
ation. Firstly, PAG failed to distinguish between different
types of xenotransplantation carrying ‘different levels of as-
sociated public health and personal risks’ (Wright 2002,
40–41). Wright Jr argued that a tailored policy response
was preferable to a blanket prohibition of all xenotrans-
plantation clinical trials. While he acknowledged that whole
organ xenotransplantation was premature, he supported (i)
clinical experimentation on cellular therapies for diabetics
and patients with Parkinson’s diseases; and (ii) ‘ex vivo per-
fusion of transgenic pig liver’ for patients with terminal liver
failure and without a liver donor (Wright 2002, 41).
Secondly, Wright claimed that there were defects and
anomalies in the procedures and processes adopted by
PAG. He argued that the overarching question was too
vague and considerable variability in the outcomes from
citizen forums suggested the influence of experts in the
deliberations (Wright 2002, 40–41). He queried the suit-
ability of some experts appointed to makes presentations
to the citizen juries (Wright 2002, 41; Wright 2003, 475;
Wright 2004, 1112). In addition, he was highly critical of
the lack of information provided to forum participants
about the Canadian standards:
Personally I find the fifth recommendation
bothersome, “that stringent … regulations be
developed to cover all aspects of xenotransplantation
clinical trials,” because this regulatory framework
already exists. Why did the Public Advisory Group
not summarize the Proposed Canadian Standard in
layperson terms and then present this? … Considering
that 35 % of the “no” votes were qualified (i.e., not
yet) and that one of the major concerns expressed by
the public concerned the development of appropriate
regulations, how can the results of this expensive
exercise be valid when this key information was
withheld? Surely the whole object of the exercise was
to educate the panellists before asking them to vote?
(Wright 2002, 41).
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In a subsequent paper, Wright speculated on a pos-
sible reason for the exclusion of the Canadian standards
in the provision of information to forum participants.
The standards could be taken to imply that a decision to
proceed had been made and the organisers where
‘attempting to keep the exercise nondirective’ (Wright
2004, 1113).
Thirdly, Wright Jr asserted that the ‘severely flawed
process [in the public consultation was] compounded by
over-interpretation of data’ (Wright 2003, 476). In his view,
19 % of citizen panelists who voted a ‘qualified no’ - that is,
‘no, not now but possibly in the future’ – could be reinter-
preted as ‘not yet’ (CPHA 2001, 12; Wright 2003, 476).
Combing the ‘not yet’ with the ‘qualified yes’ (46 %) – that
is, yes with conditions – gives a total of 65 % of participants
supporting xenotransplantation. Based on this analysis of
the data, Wright Jr argued that ‘approximately two-thirds
of ‘meaningfully’ informed Canadians support xenotrans-
plantation as a possible future treatment, but only if its
safety and efficacy can be demonstrated’ (Wright 2003,
476). Wright decried the separation of the ‘qualified yes’
and ‘qualified no’ as ‘blatantly invalid’ (Wright 2004, 1113).
However, the above argument posed by Wright Jr is not en-
tirely new. It was raised in relation to an earlier discussion
on the results from an Australian survey on patient atti-
tudes towards xenotransplantation. In that instance,
Mohacsi et al responded to their critics from the sciences
by reminding readers that ‘the data are not in dispute,
merely their interpretation (Mohacsi et al. 1998, 41). The
exchange between Wright and social scientists over public
opinion data has been aptly described as ‘a war over publics’
(Tallachini 2011, 181).
In addition to the above criticisms, Wright also af-
firmed his support for public consultation. He sum-
marised what he considered to be problematic about the
Canadian response as follows:
Where the Canadian Public Health Association went
wrong was in its attempt to design the consultation,
analyze the results and make recommendations
entirely at “arm’s length.” None of the authors were
personally knowledgeable about xenotransplantation;
thus, members missed flaws in the process and
interpretation that were readily apparent to someone
knowledgeable about the field [Wright 2002]. At no
point was there any opportunity for feedback. In stark
contrast, the Expert Working Group’s Standard went
through 14 drafts (reviewed by committee members,
multiple other experts and various interest groups)
over approximately 3 years before its official release
(Wright 2004, 1113).
He concluded that whether clinical trials should proceed
is a decision for experts rather than the public. In his view,
the public ‘can only decide whether this is a form of ther-
apy they would potentially like to have available at some
point in the future’ (Wright 2003, 476). Bach and Ivinson
responded by arguing that public engagement should not
be equated with a referendum. The challenge is to find
ways of incorporating the ‘public’s voice’ into the pro-
cesses of constructing public policy (Ivinson and Bach
2002, 43). Though Wright agreed with the response made
by Bach and Ivinson, he also reiterated the accuracy of his
interpretation of the data: ‘I believe that the Canadian
Consultation was useful and that a correct analysis shows
considerable support for the concept’ (Wright 2004,
1113). The Australian xenotransplantation inquiry com-
menced not long after the Canadian public consultation
concluded. As we will see below, Wright's comments in-
fluenced some aspects of the approach and design of the
Australian inquiry.
The Xenotransplantation controversy in Australia
On 16th March 2000, journalist Deborah Smith wrote
an article in the Sydney Morning Herald titled, ‘Pig-tissue
Transplant given the Green Light’ (Smith 2000a). Her
article focused on a local study led by Bernie Tuch,
Professor of Medicine at the University of New South
Wales (UNSW). Tuch and his colleagues were based at
the Prince of Wales Hospital in Sydney. They had ob-
tained approval from the ethics committe of the South-
Eastern Sydney Area Health Service (SESAHS) to con-
duct a small pilot study involving the use of pig islets
to treat diabetes. The cells were obtained from ‘a spe-
cial herd of pigs’ screened to ensure that their cells
were free of pathogens (Smith 2000a). Tuch and his
colleagues had demonstrated that pig cells could nor-
malise blood glucose in diabetic pigs. Two days later,
however, Smith provided an update on the study as an
unfolding controversy. Ron Pirola, Chairman of the
SESAHS ethics committee, disclosed that his committee
‘spent years deliberating’ over the UNSW application
(Smith 2000b). He noted that NHMRC had been notified
through-out the process of ethics review and that a risk
management strategy was adopted to closely monitor pa-
tients once the trials began. Bernadette Tobin, Director of
the John Plunkett Centre for Ethics in Health Care in Syd-
ney, and a member of the Australian Health Ethics Com-
mittee (AHEC), called into question the safety and efficacy
of the trial. She argued that research ethics was ‘a matter
of significance to the community and not just to the
people who will benefit from the research’ (Smith 2000b).
Similarly, local and overseas virologists warned of the risk
of cross-species infection. Peter Collignon, an infectious
disease physician at the Canberra Hospital, commented,
‘Theoretically, there is a major public health risk.’ He pro-
posed that ‘the trial should be halted, at least until
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Australia has national safety guidelines on animal tissue
transplants in place’ (Smith 2000b).
By mid-August 2000, the UNSW study was suspended
(Macey 2000). NHMRC referred the matter to one of its
expert committees, the Gene and Related Therapies
Research Advisory Panel (GTRAP). Aside from provid-
ing advice on clinical trials involving gene therapy, the
role of GTRAP was expanded in 1999 to include xeno-
transplantation. Two experts in xenotransplantation and
one expert in infectious disease were appointed to the
GTRAP panel (NHMRC 2002). The chair of GTRAP
was Ron Trent, Professor of Medicine at the University
of Sydney. Trent informed the media that he was liaising
with Tuch and that the study was suspended after he con-
ducted discussions with the SEAHS Ethics Committee. He
stated, ‘the concerns were that the safety issues had not
been discussed. The safety issues are still not totally clear.
At the moment, the study is on hold’ (Macey 2000). The
decision by NHMRC to intervene coincided with a deci-
sion to terminate a xenotransplantation program con-
ducted in Edinburgh. On 13th August 2000, the Scottish
media reported that Geron Bio-Med Ltd had halted fund-
ing on genetically-modified pig experiments, carried out
at the Roslin Institute. Their decision was motivated by
concerns over potential retroviral infection (Peterkin
2000). Shortly thereafter, the risk of PERV infection was
underscored by results from a mice study published in
Nature. The editors reported that researchers at the
Scripps Research Institute in California demonstrated that
‘transplanting pig pancreatic islets into immunosup-
pressed mice leads to widespread infection with PERV’
(Editorial 2000, 661).
In the following month, Trent made another public
statement to clarify the status of the UNSW xenotrans-
plantation study. The study was to remain on hold until
after a national public consultation. Trent informed
journalists that AHEC was due to discuss the matter.
‘Australians would get a say on animal-to-human trans-
plants before any trials were allowed,’ he announced
(Rouse 2000). Public consultation would take place as
GTRAP prepared draft guidelines for xenotransplant-
ation research. Trent stated,
this parallel process has been forced on us because
basically there was going to be a study conducted. We
wouldn’t like to say a trial goes ahead until we knew
AHEC were happy about it, and AHEC has to make
sure that the community is happy with all of this
(Rouse 2000).
On the same day, Tuch reported on results from a
3 month mice study concerning PERV infection. In an
interview with a journalist, he remarked, ‘what we’ve found
is that when insulin-producing pig cells are transplanted
into mice which have no immune system, then pig ret-
roviruses are transmitted—but there’s no infection’
(Rouse 2000). However, he also conceded that add-
itional biosafety studies was necessary. In a document
subsequently published by the NHMRC, it appears that
GTRAP reviewed the proposed UNSW study and rec-
ommended that it not proceed. The reasons provided
included ‘lack of evidence of benefit to the patient, un-
quantifiable potential community risk and concerns
about the biological safety of the source material’
(NHMRC 2002). In addition, NHMRC also required
therapeutic trials in non-human primates before human
clinical trials could proceed.
By December 2000, NHMRC had completed the ne-
cessary administration to set up the Xenotransplantation
Working Party (XWP). The establishment of the XWP
was initiated by AHEC and the Research Committee.
The Working Party held its first meeting in early 2001.
The seven members of the XWP were drawn from the
NHMRC Council and its various committees including
AHEC, GTRAP, the Research Committee, the Animal Wel-
fare Committee and the Consumer Health Forum (XWP
2002, 4).10 The Terms of Reference instructed the XWP,
to provide advice on the scientific, ethical and
technical issues relating to xenotransplantation
research, produce guidelines for the assessment of
animal-to-human transplantation trial proposals, and
consult widely with the community about these issues
(XWP 2003b, iii).
By contrast to the Canadian response, public consult-
ation was not separated from the process of drafting and
reviewing guidelines for xenotransplantation clinical tri-
als. Kerry Breen, the initial Chairperson of the Working
Party, compared the consultation process to ‘the public
being informed of the risks and signing a communal
consent form’ (Mathewson 2002, 1). Breen’s colleague
on the XWP, Bernadette Tobin, queried whether obtain-
ing public consensus was possible. She observed that
‘there were a number of “pretty formidable” ethical con-
cerns in allowing future trials to go ahead’ (Skatsson
2002, 1). Anthony D’Apice, the then Director of Immun-
ology Research at St Vincent’s Hospital in Melbourne
and then Vice President of the IXA, welcomed the pub-
lic consultation. ‘These things are good for us,’ he
remarked. ‘One certain way of killing this science in its
infancy would be to have a disaster’ (Wroe 2002, 2).
The XWP conducted two rounds of public consulta-
tions in 2002 and 2004. Before undertaking the first
round of consultation, the Working Party published a
document titled, Draft Guidelines and Discussion Paper
on Xenotransplantation, in July 2002. The stated aim of
the discussion paper was the provision of information
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on xenotransplantation to facilitate ‘an open and frank
debate’ (XWP 2002, 20). In its draft guidelines, the XWP
proposed a list of criteria or principles which had to be
met before a xenotransplantation clinical trial could
proceed. The proposed research must ‘serve the com-
mon good’; ‘justify any risks’; ‘be scientifically sound’ and
‘therapeutic in design’; protect the ‘safety and rights of
close contacts’; ensure long-term monitoring of partici-
pants; and facilitate ‘adequately informed and voluntary
consent’ (XWP 2002, 29). The Working Party conducted
the initial consultation by inviting written submissions
and hosting meetings in four capital cities. The XWP re-
ceived 97 written submissions. A total of 65 participants
attended the public meetings held in Sydney, Melbourne
and Perth. Two ‘targeted meetings’ were held in Perth
and Adelaide with a total of 51 invited participants
(XWP 2002, 7).
While a few respondents supported the XWP draft
guidelines, the majority of respondents stated that they
were opposed to animal-to-human transplantation
(XWP 2003a, para 2.9).11 The main counter-arguments
included ‘the risk of infection for the transplant recipient
and the entire community; the violation of animal rights;
that funds and other resources could be better directed
elsewhere; and doubts about the likelihood of patients
benefiting’ (XWP 2003a, para 2.12). Lawrence Pope,
President of the Victorian Animal Welfare Association,
made scathing comments in the media. ‘It’s an appalling
abuse of animals,’ he said. ‘It’s the 21st century and most
members of the public want our governments and
brightest minds to assist animals, not come up with new
ways to torment and torture them’ (Barry 2002, 5). In an
interview with a journalist, Peter Collignon, noted that
the draft guidelines were issued on the presumption that
xenotransplantation was acceptable notwithstanding its
public health risks. Similarly to Bach, he emphasized the
importance of public consultation: ‘There has to be very
strong community discussion and agreement as to
whether you do the process at all’ (Boogs 2002, 3). Unlike
the Canadian consultation, the question posed to the
Australian public was not ‘should xenotransplantation
proceed and, if so, how?’ Rather, they were only offered an
opportunity to comment on ‘how should Australia
proceed [with xenotransplantation]?’ (XWP 2003a).
Written and oral responses from individuals and orga-
nisations feed back into the design of the second round
of public consultation. The XWP acknowledged ‘the sub-
missions and discussion at the public meetings raised
many significant concerns and identified issues that were
not fully covered by the Discussion Paper or were in need
of further consideration and discussion’ (XWP 2003a, para
2.3). The XWP reported that there were two shortcom-
ings in the initial consultation: (i) many participants
only considered solid organ xenotransplantation, and
(ii) participants did not represent ‘all interest groups’
(XWP 2003a, para 1.15–1.16). They noted that there
were few submissions from transplant recipients and
patients who may benefit from xenogeneic therapies
(XWP 2003a, para 2.9). As such, for the second con-
sultation, the XWP engaged the services of a public re-
lations company to promote community engagement
and increase public participation. The XWP was also
expanded to include new members with expertise in
animal welfare, clinical trials regulation and the man-
agement of infectious diseases (XWP 2003a, para 1.18).
An Animal Issues Sub-Committee (AIS) was formed to
address the issue of animal ethics, animal welfare and
the use of animals in experimental transplantation
(XWP 2003a, para 1.18). The Terms of Reference for
the XWP was redrafted with minor modifications
(XWP 2003a, para 1.23). A separate Terms of Refer-
ence was prepared for the AIS (XWP 2003a, para 1.24).
In early 2004, the XWP and AIS issued two docu-
ments to undertake the second round of national con-
sultation. A plain English guide on xenotransplantation
was prepared to provide accessible information for the
general public (XWP 2003b). The XWP set out its re-
sponses to the initial consultation in a second discussion
paper (XWP 2003a). Though the Working Partying ac-
knowledged that xenotransplantation was highly contested,
it concluded that ‘there are no significant in-principle eth-
ical objections to the use of live organs and tissues from an-
imals for human therapies, that would preclude any further
research to develop such therapies’ (emphasis in the ori-
ginal) (XWP 2003a, para 12.8). It reiterated a position it
adopted in the previous consultation. That is, xenotrans-
plantation clinical trials should be allowed to proceed ‘if
there are clear potential benefits, both for individual pa-
tients and for the general public’ (XWP 2003a, para 12.15).
The draft guidelines were revised to incorporate two new
topics: animal welfare and patient selection. The add-
itional guidelines required research protocols to spe-
cify clear information on the criteria for patient
selection (proposed Guideline 4) (XWP 2003a, 158).
Further, in accordance with the relevant regulations,
all pre-clinical and clinical xenotransplantation studies
are required to meet rigorous animal welfare standards
(proposed Guideline 1) (XWP 2003a, 158).
Similarly to the initial consultation, the second round
of consultation involved public meetings and a call for
written submissions. In February 2004, the XWP held
public meetings in all capital cities around the country
attracting a total of 377 attendees. On this occasion,
there were no targeted meetings. After the second round
of meetings, Jack Sparrow, the second Chairperson of the
XWP, made general comments on public responses in an
interview on national radio. Sparrow reported that trans-
plant recipients and patients on waiting lists, and their
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families supported xenotransplantation (Beaumont and
Noble 2004, 3). However, he also added that ‘Australians
are more fearful about the use of living animal material in
humans than they were 18 months ago as a result of the
severe acute respiratory syndrome and bird flu outbreaks
overseas’ (Reuters News 2004). The Working Party re-
ceived a total of 343 written submissions from respondents
in Australia and overseas (XWP 2004, 4). From its public
consultation, the XWP found that ‘animal-to-human trans-
plantation, in particular animal organ transplantation, is
not acceptable to many people’ (XWP 2004, vii).
Interest groups added to the debate by publishing
contradictory outcomes from two separate public opin-
ion surveys conducted in 2004. A poll commissioned by
Pfizer Australia and Transplant Australia12 found that
70 % of respondents would accept an organ from an ani-
mal in ‘a life-or-death situation’ (Wood 2004, 24). This
study surveyed 1500 people from all states and territories
(Anderson 2004, 14). On the other hand, the Australian
Association for Humane Research (AAHR) presented a
contrary perspective based on the outcomes of a Newspoll
survey they commissioned. Newspoll interviewed 1200
adults in late May 2004. The survey revealed that only 5 %
of interviewees knew what xenotransplantation was and
31 % did not think that the process should be approved
for clinical trials (The Mercury 2004, 6). AAHR reported
that the three most common reasons for opposing xeno-
transplantation included ‘the belief that it is unethical …
that humans and animals are too different … and that it is
dangerous to human health’ (AAHR 2004). Given the lack
of public awareness about xenotransplanation, AAHR
concluded that the education campaign conducted by
XWP was ineffective and the approval of xenotransplant-
ation clinical trials would place ‘the Australian public at
risk without their knowledge and informed consent’
(AAHR 2004).
By September 2004, the XWP submitted their Final Re-
port and proposed Clinical Guidelines for Animal-to-
Human Transplantation Research to the NHMRC Council.
Council examined and debated the content of these docu-
ments over two meetings. Initially, the XWP had opposed a
moratorium on all types of animal-to-human clinical trials
including solid xenotransplants (XWP 2003a, 155). How-
ever, by the end of the Inquiry, the XWP modified its pol-
icy. In its Final Report, the XWP advised that,
… AOT [animal organ transplants] trials should not be
considered for at least the next 5 years, on the basis
that theoretical concerns suggest that this type of
transplant carries the greatest risk of infection, current
evidence indicates that this risk is not outweighed by
likely prospects of success, and there is a high level of
public concern about animal welfare for the animals
involved in this type of research (XWP 2004, 27).
At its 154th session, the NHMRC Council adopted
two recommendations proposed by the Working Party.
On 20th September 2004, it issued a communique an-
nouncing that there would be a 5 year ban on (i) whole
organ animal-to-human transplantation; and (ii) the use
of non-human primates (eg baboons) as a source animal
for clinical transplantation (National Health Medical
Research Council NHMRC 2004a). The latter policy is
consistent with a recommendation proposed in the Nuf-
field Council report (Nuffield Council on Bioethics 1996,
viii). The NHMRC Council explained that it had reached
its decision by taking into account ‘community concerns
raised during two rounds of national consultation, in-
cluding fear of new infectious diseases transferring from
animals to humans and ethical and social concerns
about the use and welfare of animals’ (National Health
Medical Research Council NHMRC 2004a).
At its 155th session, the NHMRC Council declined to
endorse the Final Report and Draft Guidelines. The
XWP proposed the establishment of a national com-
mittee to oversee research on animal cell therapies and
animal external therapies, comparable to UKIXRA
(Xenotransplantation Working Party XWP 2004, 27).
They also recommended that cellular and external
xenogeneic therapies should be given an ‘extremely
cautious “green light” if such trials were strictly regu-
lated in Australia.’ However, in response to both pro-
posals, Council decided otherwise. In its subsequent
Communique, Council declared that ‘there should be
no clinical trials in Australia using animal cellular ther-
apies or animal therapies for 5 years’ (National Health
Medical Research Council NHMRC 2004b).’ In a
follow-up media release issued on 10th March 2005,
the NHMRC Council explained that its decision to ban all
forms of xenotransplantation was made on the basis that
the ‘risks of transmission of animal viruses to transplant re-
cipients and the wider community had not been adequately
resolved. In addition, xenotransplantation research was at
an early stage and clinical trials in the foreseeable future
were unlikely to be of significant benefit to research partici-
pants’ (National Health Medical Research Council NHMRC
2005). The only exception to the moratorium appeared to
be the established practice of culturing human skin tissue
on ‘feeder layers of irradiated mouse cells’ to treat burn
patients (National Health Medical Research Council
NHMRC 2005). Council also instructed GTRAP to moni-
tor developments in the field and provide updates to
Council. It stated that it would reconsider its position if
new information became available (National Health
Medical Research Council NHMRC 2005). On the direc-
tion of Council, the final report and draft guidelines were
made public as ‘not endorsed’ documents.13 The Austra-
lian xenotransplantation moratorium was implemented
from 2005 to 2009.
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Towards the end stages of the moratorium, the
NHMRC Council revisited the issue to consider the future
direction of xenotransplantation research in Australia. A
media release was issued on the 10th December 2009.
Michael Good, Chairperson of the NHMRC Council,
stated, ‘After careful consideration, the Council is of the
view that, although there is a wide range of community
views on the topic, xenotransplantation research was ac-
ceptable in Australia when there are robust regulations in
place’ (National Health Medical Research Council NHMRC
2009a). NHMRC indicated that it would develop guidance
documents for researchers and ethics committees based on
advice from AHEC and the Animal Welfare Committee.
The announcement was welcomed by researchers and
JDRF (Australia). Living Cell Technology Ltd (LCT), a pri-
vate research company based in New Zealand, immediately
issued a media release expressing its intentions to expand
its xenotransplantation clinical trials into Australia (Living
Cell Technologies 2009). At the time, LCT had just re-
sumed it xenotransplantation clinical trials in New Zealand.
The New Zealand moratorium on clinical xenotransplant-
ation was lifted in December 2006.
Whereas public consultation was a key aspect of the
Australian national inquiry on xenotransplantation, the
decision to lift the moratorium did not involve any input
from the Australia public. As such, this decision has
been called into question by its critics. AAHR issued a
media release to call for a public debate. It maintains
that a ‘community decision’ is necessary since ‘it will be
the general public that will pay the ultimate penalty for
any fallout’ (Australian Association for Humane Re-
search 2009). Sociologist, Peta Cook, noted that ‘all
forms of ctXTP [clinical xenotransplantation] are now
theoretically possible in Australia (subject to ethical ap-
proval)’ (Cook 2014, 681). She argued that the public
was marginalised and their diverse knowledge devalued
because the public consultation conducted by the XWP
did not facilitate ‘meaningful public engagement’ (Cook
2011, 67). At the same time, however, she also acknowl-
edged that public input had a bearing on government
decision-making. Cook wrote,
this decision [ie placing a 5-year moratorium on all
forms of clinical xenotransplantation] was informed
by community concerns and the scientific uncertainty
surround zoonosis … and social anxieties regarding
animal welfare and use … this outcome suggests that
the NHMRC respects the community and the issues
that they raised, the lifting of the moratorium on 10
December 2009 suggests otherwise’ (Cook 2014, 681).
The Final Report of the XWP proposed a review of its
recommendations and guidelines after a 5 year period.
Specifically, it prescribed that this ‘review must include
public consultation’ (Xenotransplantation Working Party
XWP 2004, viii). However, to the extent that the report
was ‘not endorsed,’ the status of its long term directions
is ambiguous. The recent NHMRC decision to permit
clinical xenotransplatantation aligns with policies in
Canada, New Zealand, United States and the European
Union. The Australian guidelines for such research do not
appear to be available on-line. On its webpage on xeno-
transplantation research, the NHMRC stated that, it ‘has
issued, using advice from its Australian Health Ethics
Committee and Animal Welfare Committee, guidance for
researchers and ethics committees involved in animal to
human studies.’ However, the only documents on this
webpage are ‘archived publications’ made available for
‘historical purposes only.’14
In support of its decision to lift the national ban, the
NHMRC published a peer-reviewed discussion paper ti-
tled, Xenotransplantation: A Review of the Parameters,
Risks and Benefits, in 2009 (National Health Medical Re-
search Council NHMRC 2009). This paper was based on
an expert consultation involving NHMRC staff and in-
vited guests. On 8th August 2008, the NHMRC held a
workshop at its Head Office in Canberra to review xeno-
transplantation research in Australia. The workshop was
attended by experts from Australia, New Zealand, Europe
and the US (National Health Medical Research Council
NHMRC 2009b, 36). Though the Australian moratorium
was not intended to impede pre-clinical xenotransplant-
ation research, the Discussion Paper noted some unantici-
pated adverse consequences. The moratorium delayed the
development of regulatory guidelines and research infra-
structure such as the building of ‘containment facilities for
source pigs’ (National Health Medical Research Council
NHMRC 2009b, 9). The discussion paper concluded,
… the consensus is that the risk posed by animal
viruses is low and can be managed via herd selection
and screening strategies provided there is a regulatory
mechanism to obligate compliance. In reality, the
risks of novel infection is more likely to be greater
with allotransplantation compared with
xenotransplantation as human donors are not
screened or held in specialised containment facilities
(National Health Medical Research Council NHMRC
2009b, 22–23).
In other words, pig husbandry allows for routine testing
of known pathogens which are not conducted on human
organ donors. As such, NHMRC argued that ‘xenografts
may be safer than allografts’ (National Health Medical Re-
search Council NHMRC 2009b, 21). The discussion paper
also mentioned that ‘xenogeneic tissue … appear to be rela-
tively resistant to infection by some of the human patho-
gens commonly complicating allotransplantation including
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HIV and the hepatitis viruses’ (NHMRC 2009b, 21). More-
over, xenotransplantation was presented as a poten-
tially superior therapy with numerous advantages over
allotransplantation including ‘virtually unlimited’ sup-
ply of tissue, flexible timing of transplant procedure,
and limited or no requirement for immunosuppression
(National Health Medical Research Council NHMRC
2009b, 20–21).
The NHMRC discussion paper, however, omitted a
critical discussion on the limitations of preclinical
screening of source pigs. This matter had already been
raised two decades ago. In 1995, referencing comments
by virologist, Jonathan Allan, Hanson wrote, ‘tests cannot
screen for the unknown, and that monitoring [of patients
and source pigs] can only tell where an epidemic origi-
nated’ (Hanson 1995, 5). Alternatively put, screening can
only prevent an outbreak of contagion where an effective
test for a known disease agent has been developed and in-
corporated into routine surveillance procedures. The
shortcomings of existing risks management strategies have
already been demonstrated in allotransplantation. To fur-
ther elaborate on the limitations of current screening
practices, I will now turn to consider some incidences in-
volving experimental and routine allograft in the final part
of this paper.
Islet Allotransplantation and the other moratorium
As the public debate over xenotransplantation took
place in different parts of the world, scientists achieved
significant progress in their research on the transplant-
ation of human islet cells. In 2000, James Shapiro and
colleagues reinvigorated the field of islet transplantation
when they announced positive results from their study
involving seven type 1 diabetes patients. Shapiro is
Professor of Surgery, Medicine and Surgical Oncology and
the Director of the Clinical Islet Transplant Program at the
University of Alberta. Subsequently called the ‘Edmonton
Protocol’, his approach introduced a steroid-free immuno-
suppression regime coupled with the implantation of a
large number of islets from multiple donors (Shapiro et al.
2000). This protocol attracted worldwide interest trans-
forming islet transplantation into a viable clinical proced-
ure. Chisholm et al summarised the key findings from the
Edmonton study as follows:
Independence from insulin injections was initially
achieved in about 80 % of patients at 1 year
post-transplant and significant reduction in
hypoglycaemia unawareness. Five years after islet
transplantation … the majority of patients (around
80 %) have c-peptide present, indicating insulin
production, but only a minority (around 10 %)
maintain insulin independence. Those who resumed
insulin therapy required half of their pre-transplant
insulin dose. Hypoglycaemic score improved
significantly post-transplant, and was maintained
over 5 years. Fifty percent of patients demonstrated
stabilisation or improvement of their diabetic
neuropathy. A recent long term follow up has
confirmed that transplant recipients also report a
significantly increased quality of life (Chisholm et al.
2010, 31).
As discussed in Part I, islet allograft is generally re-
stricted to patients with brittle or severe diabetes. Pa-
tients seeking such treatment need to demonstrate
poor quality of life and that they are at risk of health
complications exceeding the dangers associated with
islet transplantation.
Due to the outcomes of the Edmonton study, the field
of islet transplantation attracted considerable public and
private money. The first major initiative was the Immune
Tolerance Network (ITN) funded by JDRF International,
the National Institute of Diabetes and Digestive and Kidney
Diseases (NIDDK), the National Institute of Allergy and In-
fectious Diseases (NIAID). The program received US$144
million to begin its research activities in mid-2000 (Associ-
ated Press Newswire 2000). The aim of the ITN is the de-
velopment of new immune tolerance therapies. In July
2000, US President Bill Clinton launched the first inter-
national multi-centre study funded under the ITN. The
study involved nine research centres located in the US,
Canada and Europe. Robert Goldstein, Chief Scientific Offi-
cer of the JDRF commented, ‘The ITN is an intellectual
powerhouse. It is exciting to see so many world-leaders
working together with a single goal in mind’ (Associ-
ated Press Newswire 2000). Four years later at the 64th
Annual Meeting of the American Diabetes Association
in Florida, Shapiro announced the outcomes of the
ITN study. He reported that approximately half of the
cohort (19 out of the 36 participants) continued to be
insulin-independent for up to 1 year post-transplant
(Biotech Week 2004). These positive results offered
encouragement for researchers to continue their
investigations.
Following the ITN multi-centre study, the NIDDK and
NIAID established the Clinical Islet Transplantation
Consortium (CITC) in 2004. The CITC comprised of a
network of 13 research centres from the US, Canada,
Norway and Sweden. It was a 5 year program with an al-
location of US $75 million (National Institutes of Health
NIH 2004). The studies conducted by the Consortium
aimed to improve the safety and long-term function of
islet grafts.15 As a consequence of intensive research ac-
tivities, researchers have been able to significantly im-
prove the efficacy of islet transplantation. The Schulze
Diabetes Institute at the University of Minnesota ob-
tained one of the best clinical outcomes. They reported,
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all transplant recipients were protected from
hypoglycemia immediately after the transplant, 80 %
remained protected from severe hypoglycemia for
5 years post-transplant, 90 % have become insulin
independent, and more than 50 % have maintained
insulin independence for 5 years post-transplant
(Schulze Diabetes Institute 2013).
The multi-year, multi-centre clinical trials conducted
by CITC completed in Spring 2014. The outcomes of
the trails began to be reported in peer-review journals in
2014 (Ricordi et al. 2014). Based on those results, US re-
searchers are now in the process of seeking approval
from the FDA to provide islet transplants as a clinical
therapy. It is anticipated that approval may be forthcom-
ing in the near future.
In Australia, a comparable research initiative was
established in 2005 called the Australian Islet Trans-
plantation Program (AITP) (Juvenile Diabetes Research
Foundation JDRF 2006). The AITP is a collaboration be-
tween Commonwealth Department of Health and Age-
ing and JDRF (Australia). The program received an
initial allocation of $30 million. More recently, in April
2014, the Federal and Victorian governments provided
additional funding for AITP by granting it ‘nationally
funded centre status.’ The AITP linked research centres
at three clinical sites including Westmead Hospital in
Sydney, St Vincent’s Hospital (SVH) in Melbourne and
Queen Elizabeth Hospital in Adelaide. Thus far, at least
22 patients have received a total of 46 transplants (The
Edman Newsletter of the St Vincent’s Institute Medical
Research 2014). The AITP focused on the development
of an immunosuppression protocol to protect graft tis-
sue and minimise renal impairment. Consistent with
overseas studies, data from the AITP confirmed improve-
ments in metabolic outcomes and patient health following
islet transplantation (O'Connell et al. 2013). Professor
Tom Kay, Head of Islet Transplantation program at SVH,
commented, ‘What I thought were pretty serious side-
effects are manageable and justifiable’ (O'Connell 2013).’
Though islet transplantation has rapidly developed
over the past decade, it was temporarily halted for a
period due to concerns about possible contamination of
pancreatic islets. In March 2007, researchers became
aware that the enzyme used to extract islet cells was
produced with a solution containing tissue from ‘cow
brains’ (Sinnema 2007). The enzyme was manufactured
in the US by Roche Applied Science. Canadian journalist,
Jodie Sinnema, reported that a Roche supplier used fat tis-
sue from cow brains to enhance the growth of bacteria
producing the enzyme. At the time, bovine spongiform
encephalopathy (BSE) had been identified in the US and
there were a small number of reported cases of
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD). Commonly known as
brain-wasting disease, CJD is an incurable and fatal
neuro-degenerative disorder. Variant CJD (vCJD), one
type of neurological condition, is caused by the consump-
tion of beef products infected with BSE or mad cow dis-
ease. The materiality of the risk of contamination was
underscored by the prior incidences of patient death due
to various medical procedures. Since the late 1960s, pa-
tients have contracted CJD following corneal graft, dura
mater transplant,16 and the administration of human-
derived pituitary growth hormones (Magnusson 2006).
The risk of CJD associated with the use of Roche en-
zyme was identified by the National Institute of Health
(NIH). They conveyed the news to Shapiro. The NIH
made the discovery during the process of establishing an
islet transplant program in the US . ‘Why didn’t we
know about this before the 22nd of March? I can’t truly
answer that question’, Shapiro conceded (Weber 2007).
He noted that the information pamphlets for the enzyme
did not mention ‘cow brains.’ However, a representative
from Roche countered that their catalogue indicates that
the product is only designed for the use of research and
mentions the use of animal products even though it did
not specify the particular type of tissue in question
(Weber 2007). Given the risks of infectious diseases,
JDRF International issued a global moratorium on the
use of Roche enzyme for experimental islet transplant-
ation (Goodman 2012, 238).
In the following month, Shapiro informed the local
media that he had notified all his patients about possible
contamination and the remote risk of CJD. Health Canada
estimated the risk to be ‘between 1 in one million and 1 in
10 million’ (Weber 2007). Counselling was also provided
to islet recipients in other parts of the world. Up until
then, about 600 patients had received islet transplants
worldwide including almost 100 patients at the Clinical
Islet Transplant Program at the University of Alberta
(Sinnema 2007). In Australia, six patients had under-
gone islet transplantation at Westmead Hospital
(Goodman 2012). No cases of infection have thus far
been identified. Shapiro announced that his program
would be placed on hold until they could procure a
suitable alternative enzyme as well as the necessary ap-
proval from relevant government authorities. Neil
Cashman, clinical neurologist and neuroscientist from
the University of British Columbia, expressed strong
criticisms about the technical mishap.
Products made out of cattle brain, it’s medieval. I find
it distressing that there are still products like this that
Dr Shapiro would use in his protocols without even
knowing about it. The diabetes program at U of A is
world-renowned. To find out at this stage that the
enzyme is grown in bacteria that are exposed to cow
brain is really distressing (Sinnema 2007).
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The use of bovine tissue in the production of the
Roche digestive enzyme demonstrates the ways in which
animal material is deeply embedded in contemporary
systems of manufacture and production. In the context
of biomedical research, our dependency on animal bod-
ies is taken for granted and overlooked, even by leading
experts working in the field.
The JDRF moratorium coincided with the mid-point
of the Australian moratorium on animal-to-human
transplantation. Ironically, the pre-cautionary ban on
xenotransplantation offered protection against the risks
of infectious diseases in a way which was not available to
the early recipients of experimental islet allografts. It
clearly indicates the need for vigilance whether scientists
are experimenting with biological materials sourced
from animals or human donors. Without a safe digest
enzyme, the Australian Islet Transplantation program
was delayed by ‘many months’ (Goodman 2012, 19). Of
course, full compliance with the JDRF moratorium was
not unreasonable. At the time, the Australian transplant-
ation community had just encountered an incident of
zoonosis which resulted in the deaths of three transplant
recipients.
The ill-fated transplants took place towards the end of
2006 at two metropolitan hospitals, the Royal Melbourne
Hospital and the Austin Hospital in Heidelberg, Victoria.
Seven years later, a Victorian Coroner issued her report
into the cause of patient deaths in May 2013 (Coroners
Court of Victoria 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). The transplant
donor had travelled to Serbia for 3 months where he vis-
ited his mother and resided at a rural property. Upon his
return to Australia, the patient became ill experiencing
considerable weight loss. He died of a brain haemorrhage
in early December 2006. Experts speculated that the donor
may have contracted a virus while abroad (Anderson 2013).
They identified the agent as a novel virus comparable to an
arenavirus known as lymphocytic choriomeningitis virus
(LCMV) (Palacios et al. 2008). Since 2003, LCMV has been
linked to several clusters of patient deaths following trans-
plantation in four states in the US (Singh et al. 2013). This
virus is contracted through exposure to rodents including
rats, mice and hamsters. LCMV infection generally causes
mild flu-like symptoms in immunocompetent patients.
However, in the case of immunosuppressed patients, it may
result in serious symptoms such as encephalitis, an acute
inflammation of the brain.
Following the death of the donor, his liver and kidneys
were retrieved and transplanted into three female pa-
tients in December 2006. The infected organs resulted
in human-to-human transmission of the ‘LCMV-like
virus’. The first patient death occurred on New Year’s
Day, 2007. The remaining two deaths took place by the
end of the week. Currently, universal testing of organ
donors for arenavirus does not form part of standard
practices in transplantation (Singh et al. 2013). Accord-
ing to a medical epidemiologist from the US Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, the only available diag-
nostic test for arenavirus is not widely available and may
take up to a week to perform (Smith 2008).
The Victorian Coroner found that the LCMV-like
virus was the underlying cause of the deaths of all three
organ recipients. She concluded that the screening
process adopted for organ retrieval was ‘reasonable and
appropriate in the circumstances and of itself could not
have added any additional information that was likely to
have altered the outcome’ (Coroners Court of Victoria
2013a, b, c, 27). The coroner’s findings were based in
part on submissions made by surgeons involved in
organ procurement and transplantation. Professor
Robert Jones, Director of the Liver Transplant Unit at
the Austin Hospital submitted:
This particular liver … from our donor in Dandenong
was in fact a very good organ and it worked very well
and so there was certainly no concern … we would
have to feel there was a significant risk in the donor
before we would turn the donor down. As I say, every
donor we accept we’re accepting risks that this organ
may not work or it may transmit disease or it may
cause other problems and we’re weighing that against
a recipient who may die otherwise’ (Coroners Court
of Victoria 2013a, 16).
Given these comments, it is clear that organ trans-
plantation involve an appraisal of the costs and benefits
whereby access to the technology of transplantation is
conditional on a marginal though potentially serious risk
of disease. There are no possible safeguards against un-
known diseases. Neither are there safeguards where an
effective test for known diseases has yet to be designed
and implemented in the screening procedure. In
addition to the cases of LCMV and LCMV-like arena-
virus, other infections found in organ recipients include
parasites, rabies, HIV, West Nile virus, Chagas’ disease,
herpes simplex virus and hepatitis B and hepatitis C vi-
ruses (Fishman and AST Infectious Diseases Community
of Practice 2009). Thus, similarly to the practice of xeno-
transplantation, patients seeking an organ transplant
bear the risk of contracting an infectious disease which
cannot be identified through the existing screening pro-
cesses. Moreover, the incidence has catalysed a debate as
to whether Australia should introduce a policy to inform
patients of the variability of organ quality (Sunday Age
2013). The surviving partner of one of the deceased pa-
tients remarked that she and her partner would have
thought twice about the transplant operation if they
were aware that the donated kidney was ‘borderline’
(Elder 2013).
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Conclusion
Experimental islet transplantation has a long history in
both Canada and Australia. It is highly likely that the
transplantation of a partial human pancreas, performed
by Sir John Ramsay in Tasmania in 1911, was the first
allograft of its kind in the world. Similarly, as noted
above, Frederick Banting attempted canine tissue trans-
plantation following his successful research on insulin.
More recently, aside from the continuation of scientific
research in both countries, Canada and Australia have
also been the subject of social science investigations for
its national responses on xenotransplantation. Due to
the anticipation of xenotransplantation clinical trials by
Canadian and Australian researchers, both jurisdictions
responded with initiatives to engage the public in policy
decision-making. For both countries, the outcome was a
mix of the local and global as well as a fusion of tech-
nical expertise and lay perspectives concerning human
experimentation and the use of animal bodies for bio-
medical experimentation. Towards the end of 1997,
Canada began to ‘systematically’ undertake a national
public consultation on xenotransplantation to address
public health risks and the associated ‘socio-ethical, legal
and scientific challenges’ (Einsiedel and Ross 2002, 589).
Canadian scholars, Einsiedel and Ross argued that the
process of public consultation substantively contributed
to the Canadian debate on xenotransplantation in two
ways: firstly, it facilitated the ‘pluralisation of knowledge’
by allowing marginalised voices to be heard; and secondly,
it offered the public an opportunity to consider the risks
and benefits of a technology with experts (Einsiedel and
Ross 2002, 589). Following a national public consultation,
Canada effectively prioritised the role of the public by
delaying the introduction of its standards for clinical
xenotransplantation.
Another defining aspect of the Canadian response is
the absence of an official national policy on xenotrans-
plantation. Einsiedel et al suggested the lack of an articu-
lated policy could be read as in itself a ‘decision’
(Einsiedel et al. 2011b, 43). Though a non-decision is
highly ambiguous, it may also be the only workable or
realistic position to adopt given that the field is con-
strained by uncertainty regarding the risks of infectious
diseases. The introduction of the Canadian xenotrans-
plantation standards has been criticised for undermining
public health concerns and inconsistency with the prin-
cipal recommendation from the national consultation
(Mortensen 2005, 53). However, in the absence of an ex-
plicit policy commitment to a moratorium with a fixed
duration, it could be argued that the Canadian approach
was sufficiently pliable to accommodate competing na-
tional priorities for public safety and the promotion of
biotechnological innovation. Xenotransplantation has
been less of a contested political issue in Canada than in
the US and UK where opponents have contested the re-
search in the law courts (Einsiedel et al. 2011b). In
addition, the Canadian public engagement on xenotrans-
plantation also facilitated institutional learning about the
role of the public and public participation in policy-
making within Health Canada (Jones and Einsiedel
2011).
By contrast to the Canadian response, Australian pol-
icy on xenotransplantation was made and remade by the
federal agency governing medical research, the NHMRC.
Australian scientists are among the most active re-
searchers in transplantation medicine. They also partici-
pate in the development of global and local regulatory
standards for clinical xenotransplantation. The Austra-
lian national inquiry on xenotransplantation took place
after comparable inquiries were completed in other ju-
risdictions. As such, it was in a position to draw upon
and learn from the experiences of other countries in-
cluding Canada. In 2009, the NHMRC shifted from a
precautionary approach to permissive regulation of
xenotransplantation consistent with policies adopted in
other developed countries including Canada, New Zea-
land, United States and the European Union. Though
the NHMRC has indicated that it has issued guidelines
for ‘animal to human studies,’ this document do not ap-
pear to be available on their website. Within a consen-
sual model of decision-making, Australian efforts to
engage in experimental democracy appear to become
un-done when competing national priorities for scien-
tific innovation took precedence in 2009. As noted
above, there are conflicting views as to whether or not
public consultation was necessary or required before the
lifting of the national ban (Xenotransplantation Working
Party XWP 2004; National Health Medical Research
Council NHMRC 2009b). A subsequent public consult-
ation did not take place in Canada. However, unlike Can-
adian social science research, no comparable empirical
research has been conducted to assess whether or not
there has been institutional learning regarding the import-
ance of public participation in the development of health
and research policy at the NHMRC.
Public controversies over islet allograft and xenograft
render visible the ambiguity of our taken for granted
boundaries concerning species difference, knowledge
production, and risk management in transplantation sur-
gery and experimentation. As note above, the Australian
ban on clinical xenotransplantation coincided with the
JDRF moratorium on islet allotransplantation in 2007.
These incidences illustrate that the risk of infectious dis-
eases is problematic not only in xenotransplantation but
also in allotransplantation. Stringent measures are neces-
sary to regulate both experimental and routine trans-
plantation. Ironically, the ban on xenotransplantation
clinical trials provided protection for patients in a way
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which was not available to transplant recipients and re-
search participants receiving islet allografts under the
Edmonton Protocol. In its 2009 report on xenotrans-
plantation, the NHMRC omitted a discussion on the
JDRF global moratorium in the context of islet allograft.
Yet, allotransplantation is also an important point of
comparison for its analysis of xenotransplantation. As
noted above, the NHMRC paper articulated the claim
that ‘xenograft may be safer than allograft’ (National
Health Medical Research Council NHMRC 2009b, 21).
In its support of clinical xenotransplantation, NHMRC
advocated the practice of screening source pigs and
monitoring for infectious diseases without addressing
the limitations of such procedures. Due to the possibility
of human error, a rigorous and robust approach on the
regulation of clinical xenotransplantation would also
need to take account of potential accidents and inadver-
tence. British biochemist and Nobel laureate, Richard
Roberts, made the obvious point succinctly, ‘Humans are
human. People make mistakes’ (Sample 2014, 32). With
the expiry of the xenotransplantation moratorium in
Canada, Australia and elsewhere, it remains to be seen
how clinical research in this field will unfold and
whether developments in virology will have a bearing on
the future trajectory of experimental transplantation as
has been the case in the past.
Endnotes
1Examples of internal therapies include cellular and
whole organ xenotransplantation. External therapies
refer to exposure of the human body or bodily fluids to
animal biological material such as the use of pig skin to
treat severe burns and extracorporeal perfusion of trans-
genic pig livers for patients with liver failure.
2Emerita Professor, Barbara Adam, coined the term ‘time-
scape’ to highlight the importance of studying temporality
and the temporal order. She explained her concept by
drawing an analogy with other types of ‘scapes’, underscor-
ing the significance of spatiality and materiality: ‘… land-
scapes, cityscapes and seascapes mark the spatial features
of past and present activities and interactions of organisms
and matter, timescapes emphasise their rhythmicities, their
timings and tempos, their changes and contingencies. A
timescape perspective stresses the temporal features of liv-
ing. Through timescapes, contextual temporal practices be-
come tangible.’ (Adam 1998, 10). For the purposes of this
paper, an example of changing timescapes are the periods
before, during and after the imposition of a national mora-
torium on clinical xenotransplantation.
3Decades later, extracts from Ramsay’s paper was repro-
duced in a journal article written by John C H Morris in
the Medical Journal of Australia (Morris 1988).
4Historically, surgeons used the term ‘heterotransplan-
tation’ to refer to cross-species transplantation. This
term was substituted with the word ‘xenotransplantation’
in the early 1960s (Deschamps et al. 2005).
5The operation is a heterotopic heart transplant under-
taken with the aim of removing the animal heart at a
later stage should the native heart recover or a human
heart becomes available (Deschamps et al. 2005).
6Four years later, the position of the European Union
shifted following a report issued by the ‘Working Party
on Xenotransplantation.’ In June 2003, the Council of
Europe issued a Recommendation 10 to permit clinical
xenotransplantation subject to conditions. Article 4 of
the Recommendation stipulates, ‘no xenotransplant-
ation should be carried out in a member state that does
not provide regulation for xenotransplantation activ-
ities in conformity with the provisions of this recom-
mendation.’ Council of and Europe. Recommendation
Rec (2003) 10 of the Committee of Ministers to member
states on xenotransplantation. Adopted by the Committee




7For the Inventory on Human Xenotransplantation
Practice website see, <http://www.humanxenotransplan-
t.org/home/index.php>.
8The transcript of the debate is posted on the website of
the Islet Foundation: see Islet Foundation, The Xenotrans-
plantation Debate Continues … (28 February 2008) <http://
islet.org/32.htm>.
9In Canada, clinical xenotransplantation can only
proceed with the approval of Health Canada. Xenografts
are regulated as therapeutic products under the Canad-
ian Food and Drugs Act (1985), the Food and Drugs
Regulation (2001) and the Medical Devices Regula-
tion. In addition, investigators are obligated to meet
safety requirements set out in the Guidance Docu-
ment on the Regulation of Medical Devices Manufac-
tured from or Incorporating Viable or Non-Viable
Animal Tissue or their Derivative(s) (Mortensen 2005,
47-49).
10The NHMRC Council is the principal governing
body of the NHMRC.
11The XWP analysed the written submissions by distin-
guishing between ‘explicit statement’ and ‘views inferred
from text.’ A total of 25 submissions were in favour of
animal-to-human trials (10 ‘explicit statements’; 15 ‘views
inferred from text’). A total of 66 submission were op-
posed to such trials (56 ‘explicit statements’; 10 ‘views in-
ferred from text’).
12Transplant Australia is a ‘national charity repre-
senting transplant recipients, donor families, living
donors and all those touched by organ and tissue do-
nation and transplantation.’ For further information,
see their website: <http://transplant.org.au/# > .
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13In a 2014 paper, Cook noted that the ‘final recom-
mendations of the XWP … are … no longer freely avail-
able on the internet’ (Cook 2014, Footnote 4, 684). I
concur with her observation. It appears that the Final
Report of the XWP and the NHMRC media release
dated 10th March 2005 have been retracted.
14For details, see NHMRC webpage, Animal to
Human Transplantation Research (Xenotransplantation)
<https://www.nhmrc.gov.au/health-ethics/ethical-issues/
animal-human-transplantation-research-xenotransplant-
ation>. This page does not have a publication date. As of 6
August 2015, the page was last updated on 2 December
2014.
15For the CITC website, see <http://www.citisletstu-
dy.org/>.
16Dura Mater (Latin for ‘tough mother’) is a thick
membrane closest to the skull. It covers the brain and
spinal cord. Dura mater is generally used when suturing
is not an adequate procedure to treat damage to the
brain.
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